The Washington Post
Kim Jong Unâ€™s visit to Beijing this week was brief. After a 20-hour journey to the Chinese capital aboard his armored green train, the young North Korean leader spent barely a day at his destination. But it was still an important visit - and the target audience appears to be President Trump, whoâ€™s pursuing ambitious foreign-policy goals with both North Korea and China.
Kimâ€™s fourth visit to China in 10 months wasnâ€™t quite as spectacular as prior trips: Kim attended a banquet with President Xi Jinping on Tuesday evening, his 35th birthday, The Washington Post reported. The next morning, he toured a factory producing traditional Chinese medicines, lunched with Xi and returned home.
Speaking to the state-run Global Times newspaper, Chinese analysts said the real focus of the trip was not pharmaceutical but geopolitical. North Korea and the United States plan a second meeting between Trump and Kim, a sequel to their historic meeting in Singapore last June.
Despite ambitious talk after that event, the first-ever summit between sitting North Korean and American leaders, each side has since accused the other of violating promises that were made. While North Korea has stopped overt testing of missiles and nuclear weapons, it has not denuclearized. Meanwhile, U.S. and U.N. sanctions on Pyongyang remain in place. The hope is that a second summit might make some real progress after months of stalling.
But Trumpâ€™s trade war with China complicates things. While Kim was in Beijing, negotiators from the United States were also in the city working on the next steps toward calming the economic standoff between the two nations.
Trump tweeted Tuesday that the talks were going â€śvery well!â€ť The Wall Street Journalâ€™s Lingling Wei also reported some positive movement in the dispute after an unscheduled third day of discussions. Other observers, however, looked at the timing of Kimâ€™s unannounced trip to Beijing and wondered about the effect it might have on U.S.-China trade diplomacy.
China has obvious reasons - at least theoretically - to gain from tying nuclear and trade diplomacy together. Xi could potentially use Chinaâ€™s leverage over North Korea as a valuable concession in trade talks with the United States, trading flexibility from Washington for more support in pressuring Pyongyang.
Thereâ€™s no doubt Beijing has plenty of leverage over North Korea. China is, by far, Pyongyangâ€™s largest trading partner - accounting for 90 percent of North Koreaâ€™s international trade volume since 2000, according to a recent report from the Korea Development Institute. One of the most impressive feats of Trumpâ€™s â€śmaximum pressureâ€ť North Korea policy was persuading China to implement U.N. sanctions against Pyongyang, something it was long hesitant to do.
The reality may be somewhat different. It appears that China did expect to get more leeway on the trade issue if it helped push North Korea into talks with the United States last year. Indeed, Trump repeatedly said as much. As he tweeted April 11: â€śI explained to the President of China that a trade deal with the U.S. will be far better for them if they solve the North Korean problem!â€ť
That clearly hasnâ€™t worked. A little over a year after that tweet, the Trump administration imposed tariffs on China, sparking the trade war that he had seemed to be willing to postpone. But itâ€™s also worth noting that Trump subtly criticized Xi last June for not sticking to the implementation of sanctions on North Korea. â€śHe has really closed up that border,â€ť Trump told reporters in Singapore. â€śMaybe a little less the last couple of months. Thatâ€™s OK.â€ť
As for North Korea, Kim could play China against the United States, turning to one for relief whenever the pressure from the other got to be too much. Trump continues to talk about his summit with Kim as a key foreign-policy victory, and the promise of further wins will be a potent bargaining chip for Pyongyang.
Adam Taylor writes about foreign affairs for The Washington Post. Originally from London, he studied at the University of Manchester and Columbia University.